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It is critical that pilots make appropriate flight path deviation decisions when faced with threats of inclement
weather. This research demonstrates a latent growth model of pilots’ confidence in flight path deviation decisions
when faced with potential weather threats. Twenty-four commercial airline pilots encountered 6 weather threats
during a simulated flight from New York, NY to Miami, FL. Pilots made deviation decisions at 4 distance points
from each potential weather threat. Results from the latent growth model (LGM) of pilots’ distance confidence as a
function of the distance to the potential weather threat showed a statistically significant growth in confidence as
pilots flew closer to the weather threat. Pilots exhibited an escalated commitment bias such that confidence in
subsequent decisions increased more if their confidence was high in the initial decision. Weather forecasting is
unreliable; therefore airlines should train pilots to avoid this type of decision making bias.
incomplete and unreliable information; therefore,
pilots make decisions under uncertainty from a lack
of information (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). In such
situations pilots may manage uncertainty by making a
best guess with limited information, evaluating the
advantages and disadvantages associated with
deviating from the flight path, or ignoring uncertainty
(Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). Naturalistic decision
making describes how people make initial decisions
under uncertainty, yet it fails to explain how people
view their initial decision over time.

Introduction
Pilots make frequent and important decisions about
flight path deviations to avoid potential weather
threats. There is pressure to minimize fuel
consumption and flight time and to maximize
passenger comfort; therefore it is important to make
appropriate decisions about potential weather threats.
Weather information is particularly unreliable at
farther distances from the center of the potential
threat. Yet pilots must quickly make appropriate
decisions regarding deviations from the original
flight plan. Their confidence in their initial decision
may influence their confidence at later time points.
Yet it is important that pilots remain unbiased and
flexible when facing potential weather threats. For
this study, investigators studied how confidence in
deviation decisions changed as pilots flew closer to
the potential weather threat. Most importantly, the
researchers studied how confidence in an initial
decision influenced confidence in subsequent
decisions.

Escalating bias refers to a decision maker viewing
past decisions more favorably if he or she was
initially involved in making the decision (Russ,
2004). Most of the past research concerning
escalation of commitment focused on monetary
investments (Hantula & DeNicolis-Bragger, 1999;
Lewicki, 1980), specifically the notion that people
may inappropriately commit to failing investments
because of their bias. This is relevant for decisions
made across time because people’s opinions of their
initial decision impact subsequent decisions despite
new information. Research suggests that investors
may commit to their initial decision even when they
discover that their initial decision had negative
consequences (Lewicki, 1980).

Naturalistic decision making models illustrate how
teams make meaningful decisions in complex
environments (Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu & Salas,
2001). Pilots make complex decisions in demanding
environments and these decisions have a large impact
on the safety of passengers. This is applicable to how
experienced aviators respond to uncertain
information. Weather information often provides

There are several reasons why escalated
commitment occurs. People’s confidence in their
initial decision may increase over time because of
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the notion of sunk costs (Staw, 1976). Research
suggests that people may regard their initial
decision more positively when they devoted
considerable effort and time to a subsequent action
(Garland, 1990). Therefore people are unwilling to
suspend a project once they invested in it.

Participants
Twenty-four male commercial aviation and air carrier
pilots participated in this study. We recruited pilots
from six different airlines, including: American
Airlines, Delta, FEDEX, Northwest, United Airlines,
and U.S. Airways. Twelve of the pilots were Captains
and 12 were FOs. We randomly assigned pilots to
flight crews consisting of a Captain and an FO.
Captains’ ages ranged from 46 to 60 years (M =
55.33, SD = 4.01), whereas FOs’ age ranged from 34
to 56 years (M = 46.00, SD = 6.02). Captains’ flight
experience ranged from 10,000 to 19,000 flight hours
(M = 13,166.67, SD = 2,910.27), whereas FOs’ flight
experience ranged from 5,000 to 13,800 flight hours
(M = 8,845.83, SD = 2,383.80).

Escalation of commitment is applicable to other types
of decision making, especially when decisions are
made under uncertainty. In aviation, pilots receive
unreliable information about potential weather threats
and they must decide to maintain their current flight
path or deviate from it. Escalated commitment in this
instance refers to a greater sense of confidence in the
initial flight path decision as pilots approach adverse
weather. People may experience escalated
commitment as the action nears completion.
Therefore, pilots would be less likely to change their
action as they draw nearer to the weather threat
(Boehne & Paese, 2000).

Independent Variable
We presented flight crews with weather information
regarding potential weather threats at four distance
points from the center of the potential weather threat:
160nm, 80nm, 40nm, and 20nm. Flight crews received
static images of potential weather threats at each of
these distance points through two automated systems:
a simulated real-time Onboard weather system and a
simulated delayed NEXRAD weather system. The
focus of this study was to examine how flight crews’
decision-making confidence changed as a function of
decreasing the distance away from potential weather
threats. Therefore, we coded the variable distance as: 160nm, -80, -40, -20nm from the center of the
potential weather threat. The major reason for doing
this was to ease the interpretation of results.

The purpose of this study was to develop a latent
growth model of pilots’ confidence of their decision
making when faced with potential weather threats.
The researchers hypothesized that the pilots would
exhibit escalated commitment bias and become more
confident in their original decision as they flew closer
to weather threats (Boehne & Paese, 2000; Staw,
1976). Commercial airline pilots flew from New
York, NY to Miami, FL. During the round trip flight,
pilots encountered six potential weather threats at
four distance points from the center of the potential
weather threat. The pilots rated their confidence in
each decision.

Dependent Measures

Method

Decision-making confidence. Once flight crews
received information from both the Onboard and the
NEXRAD weather systems, they had to make teambased decisions and answer each of four weather
deviation questions at each distance point from the
potential weather threat (i.e., 160nm, 80nm, 40nm,
20m). The first question required flight crews to rate
their confidence that a weather threat actually existed
on a 0 to 100 continuous rating scale. The second
question assessed flight crews’ confidence that they
should avoid the potential weather threat and deviate
from the predetermined flight path, also on a 0 to 100
continuous rating scale. The third question required
flight crews to make an ultimate decision about
whether or not to deviate. However, for the purposes
of maintaining experimental control, flight crews
were not allowed to actually deviate from the
predetermined flight path. The results from the
previous questions were analyzed elsewhere (see

Experimental Design
We used a multilevel experimental design. Flight
crews’ team-based decision-making confidence
constituted the dependent measure. Confidence at
each distance level from the potential weather threat
(i.e., 160nm, 80nm, 40nm, 20nm) was nested within
each flight crew, which was composed of a Captain
and a First Officer (FO).
Flight crews flew a roundtrip from New York, NY to
Miami, FL. Throughout each flight leg, flight crews
encountered three potential weather threats, for a
total of six potential weather threats. However, to
increase the reliability of the dependent measure, we
aggregated flight crews’ decision-making confidence
across the two flight legs for a total of four data
points, one at each distance point.
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Bliss, Fallon, Bustamante, Bailey, & Anderson,
2005). However, the focus of this study was the last
question, which assessed flight crews’ confidence in
their decision to the third question. Flight crews’
confidence in their decision was also measured on a 0
to 100 continuous rating scale.
Materials
Flight simulator. Flight crews completed the
simulated round trip flight from New York to Miami
using an EPIC AV-B/IFR™ General Aviation Flight
Console linked to a Pentium 4 IBM-compatible
computer running Microsoft Flight Simulator 2004.
A rudder control module, sub panel assembly,
external power quadrants, and avionics stacks were
also attached to the console, which came equipped
with a flight yoke and basic flight instruments. We
simulated flight dynamics within Microsoft Flight
Simulator using a Boeing 737 aircraft model.

Figure 2. Sample NEXRAD Weather Imagery.
The Onboard system presented weather information
from the flight crews’ point of view, and it was
presented as the aircraft approached the weather
threat at 160nm, 80nm, 40nm, and 20nm from the
weather threat. The NEXRAD system presented
weather information from a “God’s-eye” point of
view, and it was also presented at 160nm, 80nm,
40nm, and 20nm from the weather threat. The
NEXRAD system updated information as it
approached the weather threat by zooming in the
specific waypoint, thereby providing flight crews
with more resolution of the area.

Weather Displays. The Onboard and NEXRAD
weather displays were modeled using Visual Basic
software and presented on a Pentium 4 IBMcompatible computer located to the right of the flight
console. Graphical Onboard (see Figure 1) and
NEXRAD depictions of weather (see Figure 2) were
periodically presented to flight crews to notify them
of potential weather threats.

Procedure
After entering the experimental laboratory, pilots
completed an informed consent form. They then
completed a background information form to provide
demographic information that included flight
experience, age, and sex. After being familiarized
with the simulator setup, pilots were randomly
assigned to Pilot Flying (PF) or Pilot-Not-Flying
(PNF) roles and were given the predetermined flight
plan. To familiarize flight crews and reduce practice
effects, we instructed them to first fly a practice flight
from Sacramento, CA to Los Angeles, CA. Flight
crews were not required to take off or land, but were
instructed to maintain an altitude of 19,000 feet, and
an airspeed of 325nm per hour through the use of the
autopilot.

Figure 1. Sample Onboard Weather Imagery.

Prior to each flight leg, flight crews also received
preflight briefing information. This information
included the flight path and a minimal packet of
weather information. The weather packet included
information such as wind speed, direction, and
convective activity along the projected flight path.
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We informed flight crews that this information was 8
hrs old. The usefulness of this information was
limited by its age to ensure that flight crews would
focus more on the weather displays.

made deviation decisions, they were not permitted to
actually deviate from the flight path.
After completion of the first flight leg, the flight
crews took a one-hour break for lunch and then
reconvened for the second experimental flight leg.
The Captain and FO switched roles for the return trip.
Once flight crews completed both experimental
flights, experimenters debriefed and dismissed them.

During the practice flight, flight crews encountered a
single potential weather threat. During most of the
flight, the weather displays did not present any
information on the monitor. The program displayed
weather information only at set distances from
potential weather events. Weather events represented
potential thunderstorms at specific waypoints that
were considered threats to flight safety. At each
distance point (i.e., 160nm, 80nm, 40nm, 20nm) from
the center of the potential weather threat, the
Onboard and NEXRAD weather displays appeared
on the weather display monitor, as well as the four
weather deviation questions. At this point, the PF was
instructed to disengage the autopilot and fly the
aircraft manually. The Captain and FO collaborated
to complete the series of deviation questions based on
the Onboard radar and NEXRAD information.
Although flight crews were permitted to work
together, they were reminded that the Captain would
give final approval of any deviation decision that was
reached. After reaching a decision, the simulation
was paused to allow pilots to individually complete a
series of questionnaires geared toward assessing each
aviator’s individual level of trust on the Onboard and
NEXRAD weather systems, their perceived level of
workload, and their perceived level of situation
awareness. Results from these measures have been
published elsewhere (see Bustamante, Fallon, Bliss,
Bailey, & Anderson, 2005).

Results
Descriptive Statistics
Preliminary statistics showed that flight crews’
decision-making confidence ranged from 55.00 to
100 (M = 90.21, SD = 9.46). Flight crews’ decisionmaking confidence seemed to be normally distributed
(Skewness = -1.18, SE = .25; Kurtosis = 1.49, SE =
.49). Furthermore, a box-whiskers plot of mean flight
crews’ decision-making confidence scores for each
flight crew indicated that there were only three
potential outliers. However, this does not raise a
major issue of concern given that the normality
assumption is based on the distribution of residuals of
the final fitted model as opposed to the observed
scores of the dependent measure.
Inferential Statistics
Flight crews’ reported decision-making confidences
during each of the distance points (i.e., 160nm, 80nm,
40nm, and 20nm) were nested within flight crew.
Because of this nested nature of the data, we
conducted a latent growth model of flight crews’
decision-making confidence using the hierarchical
linear modeling program. All models were estimated
using full maximum likelihood estimation to allow
for comparisons of deviance tests. Models were built
using a forward approach, starting with the randomeffects ANOVA and including set of variables based
on whether or not they improved the overall model fit
and were statistically significant predictors of flight
crews’ decision-making confidence.

After completing the practice flight, flight crews
began to fly the specified route from New York to
Miami. During the flight, flight crews encountered
three weather events. Graphical displays of weather
(Onboard and NEXRAD) occurred at 160nm, 80nm,
40nm, and 20nm away from the center of each
potential weather threat. Each distance represented a
decision point that required flight crews to decide
whether and how to perform weather avoidance
maneuvers based on the representation of weather
provided by the Onboard and NEXRAD displays. At
each decision point, the PF disengaged the autopilot
and manually flew the aircraft. After deciding on a
course of action, the simulation was briefly paused to
allow each pilot to complete the trust, workload, and
situation awareness questionnaires. The simulation
was resumed after the questionnaires were completed
and the flight crews continued along their original
flight route. However, as previously mentioned, to
maintain experimental control, although flight crews

Random-effects ANOVA. Results showed that the
grand mean of flight crews’ decision-making
confidence across all four distance points and all 12
teams was significantly different from zero, π00 =
90.21, SE = 2.06, t(11) = 43.75, p < .001. However,
from a mathematical point of view, this test of
statistical significance was somewhat trivial because
although the range of the decision-making confidence
scale (i.e., 0 – 100) included a value of zero, it is
unlikely to obtain such a score for the grand mean.
Nevertheless, this test of statistical significance could
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have practical applications (discussed later). Another
important point to note though was that results
showed that the variance component due to
differences between flight crews was significantly
different from zero, τ00 = 45.65, χ2(11) =114, p < .01.
The level-one variance component was 42.85. An
analysis of the intraclass correlation coefficient
revealed that approximately 51.52% of the variance
in crews’ decision-making scores was due to
differences between teams. Last, the deviance test
was significantly different from zero, χ2(3) = 660/43,
p < .001, suggesting that the random-effects ANOVA
was not a good-fitting model for the data.

Discussion
The results of our latent growth analysis showed that
pilots’ confidence in their decisions increased as they
flew closer to the center of the potential weather
threat. In fact, their confidence in their subsequent
decisions increased especially if they were initially
highly confident at the first time point.
The notion of sunk costs supports the finding that
pilots became more confident as they approached the
weather threat. Past research suggests that people
regard initial decisions more favorably even in the
presence of conflicting subsequent information
(Garland, 1990). When deciding to either deviate
from or maintain a current flight path, pilots invest
time and effort into that decision (Staw, 1976).
Therefore they may be less willing to reverse their
decision.

Decision-Making Confidence

Latent growth model as a function of distance to the
potential weather threat. The next model analyzed
was a linear growth model of flight crews’ decisionmaking confidence as a function of distance to the
potential weather threats in the presence or absence
of display agreement. Given that we did not center
the distance variable, in this model, π00 represented
the expected mean value of flight crews’ decisionmaking confidence at the center of the weather threat.
Results showed that the expected grand mean of
flight crews’ decision-making confidence at the
center of the weather threat across all 12 teams was
significantly different from zero, π00 = 92.08, SE =
1.64, t(11) = 56.26, p < .001. As expected, results
showed a statistically significant growth in flight
crews’ confidence as they flew closer to the potential
weather threat, π10 = .03, t(11) = 2.49, p < .05 (see
Figure 3).

This finding has important implications for aviation
safety. Research demonstrates that people may view
their initial decision more positively despite
information that the original decision was
inappropriate (Lewicki, 1980). It is crucial for pilots
to be flexible when presented with weather threat
information. However, greater initial feelings of
initial confidence may lead to escalated commitment
so that pilots become more confident in their flight
path decision regardless of the appropriateness of
their decision.
Pilots should be trained to effectively make decisions
by having confidence in their ability to make the
decision rather than confidence in the decision.
Orasanu (2005) suggests that aviation crew members
can make more appropriate decisions if they continue
to search for new information and reevaluate the
situation (Orasanu, 2005). Pilots should seek more
information and fill in missing information with their
knowledge and experience. Therefore training pilots
for decision making under uncertainty is crucial to
reducing errors.
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Escalated commitment may have detrimental effects
on aviation safety. Pilots’ initial decisions regarding
potential weather threats may impact their confidence
in subsequent decisions. This may cause pilots to be
inflexible when presented with updated weather
information. Therefore it is important that pilots
remain adaptable to new information despite their
previous decisions.

Distance

Figure 3. Flight-crews’ decision-making confidence.
Results also indicated a high positive relationship
between the intercepts and the slopes of the LGM, r =
.97. Furthermore, a χ2 difference test between this
model and the previous random-effects ANOVA was
statistically significantly different from zero, χ2(3) =
10.72, p < .05, which suggested that this model
significantly improved the fit to the data.
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